Local Differential Privacy (LDP) provides provable privacy protection for data collection without the assumption of the trusted data server. In the real-world scenario, different data have different privacy requirements due to the distinct sensitivity levels. However, LDP provides the same protection for all data. In this paper, we tackle the challenge of providing input-discriminative protection to reflect the distinct privacy requirements of different inputs. We first present the Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) privacy notion and focus on a specific version termed MinID-LDP, which is shown to be a finegrained version of LDP. Then, we develop the IDUE mechanism based on Unary Encoding for single-item input and the extended mechanism IDUE-PS (with Padding-and-Sampling protocol) for item-set input. The results on both synthetic and real-world datasets validate the correctness of our theoretical analysis and show that the proposed mechanisms satisfying MinID-LDP have better utility than the state-of-the-art mechanisms satisfying LDP due to the input-discriminative protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential Privacy (DP) [1] , [2] has become the de facto standard for private data release. It provides provable privacy protection, which is independent of the adversary's background knowledge and computational power [3] . In recent years, Local Differential Privacy (LDP) has been proposed for preserving privacy at the data collection stage, in contrast to DP in the centralized setting which protects data after it is collected and stored by a server. In the local setting, the server is assumed to be untrusted, and each user randomly perturbs her raw data independently using a privacy-preserving mechanism that satisfies LDP. Then, the server collects these perturbed data from all users to perform data analytics or answer queries from users or third parties. Thus the local setting has been widely adopted in practice. For example, RAPPOR [4] proposed by Google has been employed in Chrome to collect web browsing behavior with LDP guarantees; Apple is also using LDP-based mechanism to identify popular emojis and popular health data types in Safari [5] .
Under the notion of LDP, given any output of a mechanism, the adversary cannot distinguish any pair of inputs with high confidence (controlled by a privacy budget ). Due to the uniform privacy budget, the existing mechanisms and applications that have been proposed with LDP, such as RAPPOR [4] , Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) [6] , SVIM (for set-valued data) [7] , and PrivKV (for key-value data) [8] , would perturb the data in the same way (or add the noise with the same amount) for any inputs. However, in many practical scenarios, different inputs have different degrees of sensitivity (i.e., users' desired privacy level or privacy expectation on the raw data) thus require distinct levels of privacy. For example, in website-click records or medical records, some website pages or medical diseases (e.g., HIV and cancer) are much more sensitive than others, thus need stronger privacy guarantees; on the other hand, some records are much less sensitive, such as frequently visited pages (e.g., Facebook and Amazon) that are commonly clicked by many people, or some very common symptoms in clinic such as flu and headache. Existing notions do not deal with this scenario. For example, personalized local differential privacy (PLDP) [9] only provides user-level discrimination, and geo-indistinguishability [10] only provides distance based discrimination for a pair of locations.
Motivated by such considerations, we consider the categorical data and assume the universe of inputs have multiple levels of privacy, represented by privacy budgets with different values. Note that a smaller budget indicates higher privacy requirement thus needs more protection. In practice, classifying items by privacy levels can be implemented according to some categories with semantic meanings. For example, serious diseases (e.g., various cancers or HIV) can be classified in the highest privacy level, while moderate diseases (e.g., asthma or hypertension) and common symptoms can be classified in the medium and lowest privacy levels respectively. Since each possible input x in domain D has its privacy budget x (inputs with the same privacy level have the same budget), the privacy budget of standard LDP should be = min x∈D { x } to satisfy the required privacy for all inputs. This notion would provide excessive protection for some inputs that do not need such strong privacy, which is unnecessary and will lead to an inferior privacy-utility tradeoff.
In this paper, we aim at providing input-discriminative privacy with required distinct protection for each input and high utility on frequency estimation. We first study how to formalize a privacy notion in the local setting that provides discriminative privacy protection for different inputs. We propose a notion called Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) by converting the differentiated protection for inputs into different indistinguishability level for pairs of inputs. Theoretically, the indistinguishability of a pair of inputs x, x can be any function of their budgets x , x , in this paper we focus on one instantiation of ID-LDP, termed MinID-LDP with the minimum function. MinID-LDP relaxes LDP on the inputs that do not need too strong privacy protection and we will show that the relaxation is at most twice of the budget of LDP under a fully-connected indistinguishability graph (in Lemma 1). In summary, MinID-LDP can provide fine-grained protection where each input is protected with required indistinguishability, while LDP would provide the same protection for all inputs with the highest privacy level.
Under our MinID-LDP notion, users need to perturb different inputs with different parameters related to the distinct privacy budgets. However, in the local setting, the privacy requirement should be satisfied for any pair of inputs x, x and any output y, which makes the problem complicated since the perturbation parameter of a specific input may also depend on other inputs' privacy budgets. To find the optimal mechanism for a real-world query function, a potential solution is to formulate an optimization problem with the goal of maximizing query utility given privacy as constraints. However, it will involve too many variables and constraints. For example, assume the domain size (the number of inputs) is m, and the mechanism perturbs all inputs into another one by a perturbation matrix P ∈ R m×m , where each element represents the probability of perturbing one input into another one. Then, the problem of finding the optimal perturbation probabilities has m 2 variables and m 3 privacy constraints (for any pair of inputs and any output), which makes it impractical for real-world data with a large domain.
In this paper, we design two efficient and near-optimal mechanisms satisfying ID-LDP for frequency estimation on single-item and item-set data respectively. First, we propose the Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE) mechanism for single-item input. In our optimization problem of assigning the perturbation probabilities in IDUE, the number of variables and constraints are reduced to 2t and t 2 respectively (t is the number of privacy levels). The IDUE mechanism works well for single-item data. However, when the input is an item-set, i.e., any subset of the item domain, solving the optimization problem to determine the perturbation probabilities is not scalable due to an exponential blowup of the number of subsets. Thus, we combine our IDUE mechanism with Paddingand-Sampling (PS) protocol [7] to design a novel IDUE-PS mechanism for set-valued data. The privacy budget of a set is a function of the individual privacy budgets of items in the set. We will show that the perturbation probabilities of IDUE-PS (for item-set input with an exponential blowup) can be determined by IDUE (for single-item input) to satisfy MinID-LDP (in Theorem 4) with a scalable optimization problem. Given the privacy level of each input, our proposed mechanisms satisfying MinID-LDP provide better privacy-utility tradeoff than -LDP (where = min x∈D { x }). It is because our mechanisms achieve fine-grained privacy protection; whereas, the existing mechanisms satisfying LDP guarantee the highest privacy level.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper.
(1) We introduce a new privacy notion called Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) with an instantiation termed MinID-LDP, which allows finer-grained protection for different inputs than LDP.
(2) We design the Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE) mechanism for single-item input that satisfies MinID-LDP and propose the frequency estimation protocol with an unbiased estimator. To minimize the Mean Square Error (MSE) of IDUE, we formulate an optimization problem to solve the perturbation probabilities for the mechanism and derive three practical variants of the optimization model.
(3) We propose the IDUE-PS mechanism for item-set inputs by extending the IDUE mechanism with Padding-and-Sampling (PS) technique and show that IDUE-PS satisfies the notion of MinID-LDP with the same computation cost as IDUE that is designed for single-item input.
(4) We validate the correctness of the theoretical MSE analysis and effectiveness of our notion and mechanisms on synthetic and real-world datasets with both single-item and item-set types of input. We show that the proposed mechanisms outperform the existing ones for frequency estimation on categorical data. Also, the advantage of our mechanisms under the MinID-LDP notion is enhanced when the distribution of privacy budgets of all inputs are more skewed.
II. RELATED WORK
The notion of differential privacy (DP) in centralized setting was first introduced by Dwork in [1] . It assumes a trusted server that possesses all genuine dataset. Then, a number of variants of differential privacy have been studied to provide different types of privacy guarantees such as d-privacy [11] , Pufferfish privacy [12] , Blowfish privacy [13] , Bayesian DP [14] , concentrated DP [15] , and personalized DP [16] . On the other hand, Duchi et al. [17] studied the local differential privacy (LDP) without the assumption of a trusted server and several variants of LDP have been studied, e.g., geoindistinguishability [10] , personalized LDP [18] , and local information privacy (LIP) [19] . The most related work is the notion of Utility-optimized LDP (ULDP) developed by Murakami and Kawamoto [20] , which provides a privacy guarantee equivalent to LDP only for sensitive data to allow less noise and improve utility. However, this work assumes each user sends a single datum (we discuss the case of item-set input in Section VI) and is only applicable to the case of two privacy levels where one of them is non-sensitive (i.e., privacy budget = ∞). Also, ULDP provides distinct protection for two levels of outputs (protected and invertible) and is a strict relaxation of LDP (i.e., LDP guarantees ULDP, but ULDP does not provide -LDP for any ∈ [0, ∞)), while our MinID-LDP provides distinct bounds of privacy leakage for multiple (more than two) privacy levels of inputs and also guarantees LDP with some privacy budgets (see Lemma 1).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES A. Problem Statement
System Model. Our system model involves one data server and n users U = {u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u n }. Each user possesses one item or item-set and perturbs it independently via a random perturbation mechanism before uploading it to the server. Then, the server collects users' data and computes the statistical information of users' data (we focus on frequency estimation in this paper). Denote the item domain I = {1, 2, · · · , m} with size m, and the item-set domain P(I) = {x|x ⊆ I} with size 2 m , where P(I) is the power set of I. In this paper, we consider two types of input (raw data), one is the single-item input with domain D = I, where each user only possesses one item from I; another is the item-set input with domain D = P(I), where each user can possess any subset of I. We assume there are t privacy levels for the items in I, where the i-th level only contains a subset of I, denoted by I i . While the domain of the items can be large, the number of privacy levels determined by categories is usually small in practice, hence ensuring usability and scalability of the system. For convenience, we denote the set of privacy budgets of all items in I as E = { i } i∈I .
Threat Model. We assume the server is untrusted, and each user only trusts herself, because data stored on the server can be revealed via either hacking activities or due to the server selling the data to a third party. Therefore, the adversary is assumed to possess the uploaded (perturbed) data of all users and it also knows the privacy budgets for all the inputs.
Utility of Frequency Estimation. The true frequency of an item i ∈ I is defined as the number of users who possess i
where x u is the raw (input) data of a user u ∈ U and can be a single-item or an item-set depending on the application scenario, and 1 xu (i) is the indicator function, which equals to 1 if i ∈ x u and equals to 0 otherwise. Note that i only denotes one item from I, while x can be a subset of I. After collecting the perturbed (output) data from all users, the server can estimate the frequency of an item i ∈ I via an estimator c i , which is a function of the perturbed data {y u } u∈U and mechanism parameters. The utility of frequency estimation is defined by the total Mean Square Error (MSE) of estimators, i.e., MSE = m i=1 MSEĉ i , which will be minimized in the design of mechanism with privacy constraints.
B. The Notion of LDP
In the local setting, each user independently perturbs her input x (raw data) using a mechanism M and uploads M(x) to the server for data analysis. Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [17] ) For a given ∈ R + , a randomized mechanism M satisfies -LDP if and only if for any pair of inputs x, x , and any output y ∈ Range(M)
where Range(M) is the set of all possible outputs of the randomized mechanism M. Intuitively, given an output y of a mechanism M, an adversary cannot infer with high confidence (controlled by ) whether the input is x or x , which provides plausible deniability for individuals involved in the sensitive data. Here, is a parameter called the privacy budget that controls the strength of privacy protection. A smaller indicates stronger privacy protection because the adversary has lower confidence when trying to distinguish any pair of inputs x, x . LDP has the property of sequential composition, which guarantees the overall privacy for a sequence of mechanisms that satisfy LDP. Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition of LDP [21] ) If randomized mechanism M i : D → R i satisfies i -LDP for i = 1, 2, · · · , k, then their sequential combination M :
According to sequential composition, a given privacy budget can be split into multiple portions, where each portion corresponds to the privacy budget of a randomized mechanism. The sequential composition is commonly used for some complex data analysis tasks, where multiple perturbation phases are utilized to improve the utility.
C. Mechanisms Satisfying LDP
Randomized Response. Randomized Response (RR) [22] is a technique developed for the interviewees in a survey to return a randomized answer to a sensitive question so that the interviewees can enjoy the plausible deniability. Specifically, each interviewee gives a genuine answer with probability p and gives the opposite answer with probability 1 − p. In order to satisfy -LDP, the probability is selected as p = e e +1 . The standard RR only works for binary data (yes-or-no answers), but it can be extended to apply to m categories by Generalized Randomized Response or Unary Encoding.
Generalized Randomized Response. The perturbation function in Generalized Randomized Response (GRR) [7] is
where x is the input and y is the output. To satisfy -LDP, the probabilities are p = e e +m−1 and q = 1 e +m−1 , both of which would be small when the domain size m is very large compared with e .
Unary Encoding. The Unary Encoding (UE) [6] converts the input x = i into an m-length vector x = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] where only the i-th position is 1. Then each user perturbs each bit of x independently with the following probabilities
where y is the output vector. It was shown in [6] that this mechanism satisfies LDP with = ln p(1−q) (1−p)q . The selection of p and q under a given privacy budget varies for different mechanisms. For example, the basic RAPPOR [4] assigns p = e /2 e /2 +1 , q = 1−p, while the Optimized Unary Encoding (OUE) [6] assigns p = 1 2 , q = 1 e +1 , which is obtained by optimizing the approximate variance.
Frequency Estimation for GRR, RAPPOR and OUE. After receiving the perturbed data from all users, the server can implement the summation to get the total count of each bit, denoted by c i for the i-th bit. Since the perturbation is biased for bit-0 and bit-1, the server needs to calibrate the collected counts by an unbiased estimator [6] 
whose Mean Square Error (MSE) equals to its variance
where c * i is the ground truth of the counting for item i. In summary, OUE can provide higher utility than RAPPOR for frequency estimation under the same due to the optimization, and the utility of GRR would be deteriorated much more than the other two mechanisms when domain size m is large.
IV. INPUT-DISCRIMINATIVE LDP
In this section, a new privacy notion called ID-LDP is introduced, which can provide input-discriminative protection with LDP. In ID-LDP, the indistinguishability level of a pair of possible inputs x, x is determined by the corresponding privacy levels x , x of both inputs. Then, one instantiation of ID-LDP called MinID-LDP is formalized. It is proven to satisfy sequential composition theorem, which is an important property to guarantee the overall privacy for multiple query functions sequentially applied to the same database. Finally, our notion is compared with several existing privacy notions in the local setting and their relations are discussed.
A. Definition
LDP defines privacy as the maximum level of indistinguishability between any two possible inputs x and x . In practical applications, the privacy levels of different inputs could be distinct. Thus, the requirement of indistinguishability between different pairs of possible inputs x and x could be diverse. However, LDP cannot provide such fine-grained privacy protection because its definition is based on the worstcase scenario. Intuitively, discriminating inputs with different privacy levels and providing distinct protection to them can improve the utility of the query service due to the finegrained protection for different inputs. We define the Input-Discriminative LDP (ID-LDP) as follows. 
where r(·, ·) is a function of two privacy budgets.
In Definition 2, we assume inputs x and x belong to different privacy levels with privacy budgets x and x respectively and introduce a system-defined function r( x , x ) to quantify the indistinguishability between x and x . Note that the value of x for each input x is not sensitive information because x is independent of the users' raw data. In this paper, we assume { x } x∈D are universally set by the service provider. Note that, our notion can be easily combined with personalized LDP (PLDP) to reflect different privacy preferences of different users, in which case the privacy levels of all inputs can be set by users themselves. Theoretically, the notion of ID-LDP does not restrict the data type, which means it can be applied for categorical data, numerical data, or even the hybrid with multidimensions. In this paper, we mainly study the mechanism that satisfies ID-LDP for categorical data (single-item or item-set).
ID-LDP can provide input-discriminative protection with the function r(·, ·). In this paper, we mainly consider the minimum function between x and x as the privacy budget of a pair of inputs x, x , formulated by the following definition.
Intuitively, for any pair of inputs x, x , MinID-LDP guarantees that the adversary's capability of distinguishing x and x would not exceed the bound controlled by both x and x , which achieves the worse-case privacy like LDP but only for the pair. As mentioned in Section III, sequential composition is an important property to guarantee the overall privacy for a sequence of mechanisms. The following theorem shows that MinID-LDP satisfies sequential composition as well. Theorem 2 (Sequential Composition of MinID-LDP) If randomized mechanism M i :
Proof: Let x, x ∈ D be any pair of inputs, for any output y = (y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y k ) ∈ R 1 × R 2 × · · · × R k , we have
x . Finally, we have
B. Relationships and Comparison with Other Notions
Several privacy notions are related to our notion, but they have different ideas. The notion of LDP provides the worst- case privacy protection for all users and all inputs, where the global privacy budget is = min x∈D { x } to satisfy -LDP. The notion of personalized local differential privacy (PLDP) [9] , [18] provides user-discriminative privacy requirements, i.e., each user can have different privacy budget which is often assumed to be unrelated to the raw data if it would be published. Geo-indistinguishability [10] , on the other hand, can provide distance-discriminative privacy, but it originates from an input pair-centric viewpoint and requires a distance metric for the inputs. In contrast, our notion MinID-LDP provides input-discriminative privacy requirements, where each input has a privacy budget, and the distinguishability of a pair of inputs can be determined by a function of the budgets of the two inputs to bound the distinguishability of this pair. Privacy Budget of a Pair of Inputs. In Fig. 1 , we use a graph to show the difference among LDP [17] , personalized LDP (PLDP) [18] , geo-indistinguishability [10] , and our notion ID-LDP, where the vertices are inputs and edges are the distinguishability level (represented by privacy budget) of each pair of inputs. We can observe that LDP would utilize the same budget for all users and all pairs of inputs; PLDP provides different protections for different users but does not differentiate different pairs of inputs; geo-indistinguishability differentiate different pairs by the distance between them but the distance metric does not work for all data types; ID-LDP differentiates the pairs by the privacy budgets of the two inputs. The difference between LDP and MinID-LDP is that for a pair of inputs x, x , the budget of a pair in LDP is the minimum values of all budgets that are independent of the pair, while the budget of a pair in MinID-LDP is the minimum values between the two budgets x , x of inputs.
Relationships with LDP. If the privacy budgets for all inputs are the same, i.e., x = for all x ∈ D, then E-MinID-LDP becomes -LDP, which means MinID-LDP is a generalized version of LDP. In general, we have the following lemma to show their relationships. Lemma 1 If a mechanism satisfies -LDP, then it also satisfies E-MinID-LDP for all E with min{E} = . On the other hand, if a mechanism satisfies E-MinID-LDP, then it also satisfies -LDP, where = min{max{E}, 2 min{E}}.
Proof: First, the following property can be directly derived from the definitions of LDP and MinID-LDP min{E}-LDP ⇒ E-MinID-LDP ⇒ max{E}-LDP Therefore, we only need to show that E-MinID-LDP also implies (2 min{E})-LDP. Denote x * as the input that has the minimum budget, i.e., x * = min{E}. Then, for all x, x and y, the following inequality is satisfied under E-MinID-LDP
From Lemma 1, MinID-LDP relaxes LDP in at most twice of the privacy budget = min{E}. It is due to the symmetric property of the indistinguishability definition, so in a fullyconnected policy graph, if we require every pair of inputs x, x to be indistinguishable with min{ x , x }, transitivity of indistinguishability yields 2 min{E} between any pair of inputs. Note that the twice relaxation in privacy budget does not mean utility improvement is at most twice compared to LDP (depending on the query and data distribution). Although MinID-LDP can be regarded as a relaxation compared with LDP, in practice users' privacy expectation is naturally different for different inputs, hence our notion captures user's finegrained requirement, while LDP is too strong (i.e., provides overprotection) in this regard.
Prior-Posterior Privacy Leakage Analysis. To understand our privacy notions in another perspective, we compare the prior-posterior privacy leakage (i.e., Local Information Privacy [19] ) of the above notions. Denote Pr(y|x) as the probability of outputting y by given input x. The ratio between the prior probability Pr(x) of an input x and the posterior probability Pr(x|y) by observing the output y can be computed as
which quantifies the privacy leakage that the additional information the adversary can infer about an input x by observing the output y. Note that (5) is different from mutual information [23] that quantifies the average leakage for all inputs and outputs. In our case, we only evaluate the bound of privacy leakage for a given input x with an arbitrary output y. For different privacy notions, the lower bound and upper bound (independent of y) of prior-posterior privacy leakage defined by (5) are summarized in Table I (can be directly has an additional bound with respect to 2 min{E}). However, LDP and PLDP do not differentiate the inputs, thus the budget would be assigned as the minimum value of all budgets in order to satisfy the privacy, but MinID-LDP can assign the required budget for different inputs, where the bound of leakage is also input-discriminative.
C. Discussions
Additional Gain from Incomplete Privacy Policy Graph. According to Lemma 1, the gain of MinID-LDP compared with LDP is at most twice of the privacy budget, which is caused by the required privacy protection on all pairs of inputs (i.e., complete graph shown in Fig. 1 ). However, if some of the pairs do not need to be protected (such incomplete graph can be defined by the secret policy in Blowfish privacy [13] ), the gain of MinID-LDP can be larger than 2 min{E} because some inputs might not need to be indistinguishable from the inputs with the smallest privacy budget.
Other Instantiations of ID-LDP. Besides MinID-LDP, other instantiations of ID-LDP can be defined. For example, we can define AvgID-LDP as ID-LDP with the average function, i.e., r( x , x ) = ( x + x )/2, which bounds the privacy budget of a pair of inputs by the averaged budget of the two inputs. Similar to MinID-LDP, the notion of AvgID-LDP satisfies sequential composition like Theorem 2. Moreover, the perturbation mechanisms developed in Section V and Section VI are also applicable to AvgID-LDP.
V. PERTURBATION MECHANISM AND FREQUENCY ESTIMATION FOR SINGLE-ITEM INPUT
In this section, the considered input domain is D = I, i.e., single-item input. First, we formulate the optimization problem for designing a perturbation mechanism to optimize the utility of the frequency estimation of the outputs while satisfying MinID-LDP and the challenges to solve the problem. To address the challenges, we propose the Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE) mechanism and the corresponding unbiased frequency estimator. The objective function in optimization problem of solving perturbation probabilities is designed to be independent of the unknown true frequencies.
A. Objectives and Challenges
Our goal is to design a framework with perturbation mechanism and frequency estimation protocol that satisfies the proposed notion ID-LDP (MinID-LDP specifically) with the optimal or near-optimal utility of frequency estimation. The general optimization problem can be modeled as A direct way to design such mechanism is to assign a perturbation matrix P ∈ R |D|×|D| , where each element represents the perturbation probability Pr(y|x) for all x, y ∈ D (the output domain R = D in this case). Then, the elements in matrix P can be solved by an optimization problem to minimize the MSE of frequency estimation under the privacy constraints. However, this mechanism has several issues in practice. First, the MSE of frequency estimation involves true frequencies, which means the objective function of minimizing MSE cannot be directly evaluated. Second, since the number of variables is |D| 2 and the number of constraints is |D| 3 , the computation cost would be very high for D = P(I) with |D| = 2 m . Third, when the domain size |D| is very large, which is very common in practice, the perturbation probabilities will become very small because of y∈D Pr(y|x) = 1, which means the probability of reporting the true value is low, then the utility would greatly deteriorate.
In the following, we propose the Unary Encoding based perturbation mechanism and frequency estimation protocol for single-item input with D = I, where the corresponding optimization problem (discussed in Section V-D) only has 2t variables and t 2 constraints (t is the number of privacy levels). Then, this framework is extended with Padding-and-Sampling protocol in Section VI to accommodate item-set input, where the determination of the perturbation probabilities in the mechanism can be converted into the case of single-item input, which has much less computational complexity.
B. Mechanism Design
Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE). We first encode the single-item input x = i into a m-length vector
where vector x denotes the encoded input, v i denotes the vector whose i-th position is 1 and other positions are 0s. Then, each bit of the input vector x is perturbed into 0 or 1 independently to get the output vector y with probabilities where we assume a k > b k (∀k ∈ I) in order to obtain a good utility. Algorithm 1 shows the steps of the proposed perturbation mechanism called Input-Discriminative Unary Encoding (IDUE). Compared with the original Unary Encoding protocol [6] , the IDUE assigns different perturbation probabilities for different bits, which is the key point to achieve input-discriminative protection. For two different input vectors v i (only the i-th bit is 1) and v j , the probability ratio of distinguishing the pair of v i and v j by observing the output vector y is 
where the left side equals the right side if and only if y[i] = 1 and y[j] = 0. Then, the privacy constraint in (4) is
By converting the original privacy constraint into (7) , which is independent of y, we can reduce the computational complexity than the direct formulation described in Section V-A.
To obtain the optimal perturbation probabilities for our IDUE mechanism, we first develop the frequency estimator to apply for IDUE, and evaluate the theoretical MSE of the estimator as a function of perturbation probabilities. Then we formalize the optimization problem with three variants by minimizing the MSE with the privacy constraints in (7) .
C. Frequency Estimation
Denote the collected frequency of i-th bit as c i = u∈U y u [i], where y u is the output vector of a user u ∈ U. For frequency estimation, we utilize the following estimator
and briefly show thatĉ i is an unbiased estimator of the true frequency c * i defined in (1) .
ai−bi = c * i , which meansĉ i is an unbiased estimator of c * i . The frequency estimator in (8) can be regarded as the generalized version of the estimator in (3) that is used for the original Unary Encoding. Due to the unbiasedness of estimator c i , the MSE ofĉ i equals to its variance
In Section V-D, the summation of MSEĉ i will be minimized with the privacy constraint of ID-LDP.
D. Finding Optimal Perturbation Probabilities
As described in Section III-A, the input domain is divided into t subsets I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I t with different privacy levels.
Denote the number of items in subset I i as |I i | = m i and the privacy budget is i (i = 1, 2, · · · , t). We can assign the same parameters (a i , b i ) for all items in I i . If t = 1, i.e., all items in I have the same , then this case reduces to the LDP setting. The MSE of subset I i is calculated by
The expression of MSE Ii is dependent on the true frequency k∈Ii c * k , which is unknown in practice, thus cannot be established as the objective function for the optimization problem. Therefore, we propose three variants of the optimization model, named opt0, opt1, and opt2, to make the objective function independent of the true frequencies.
opt0: Optimization Model in the Worst-Case. Though MSE Ii is dependent on the true frequencies, we have the following upper bound of the total MSE since k∈Ii c * k n to get rid of unknown true frequency c *
which can be regarded as the total MSE in the worst-case. Then, determining parameters
where the scaling constant n is omitted since it does not change the result. Since the feasible region of optimization problem (10) contains the perturbation probabilities of RAP-POR and OUE, the solution solved by (10) will have less worst-case MSE than both RAPPOR and OUE.
It can be shown that the objective function in (10) is not convex in the feasible region. But after further constraining the variables (which shrinks the feasible region), the optimization problem can be convex. We consider two types of spacereducing strategies, which are related to RAPPOR and OUE respectively. They can be used to find near-optimal solutions with convex property and reduced complexity compared with the formulation in (10) . opt1: Optimization Model Constrained with RAPPOR Structure. By adding the additional constraint a i +b i = 1 (∀i), we can represent a i , b i as
where τ i > 0 (∀i). Then 1−ai−bi ai−bi = 0 and the total MSE is
m i e τi (e τi − 1) 2 with privacy constraints
Therefore, we can get the following optimization problem min τ1,··· ,τt>0
which has t variables (positive) and t 2 linear constraints. It is easy to validate that the Hessian matrix of the objective function f (τ ) is positive-definite in the feasible region. Thus, the optimization problem in (12) is convex with linear constraints. opt2: Optimization Model Constrained with OUE Structure. By adding the additional constraints a i = 1/2 (∀i), we can rewrite the privacy constraints in (7) as
Since a i = 1/2, we have 1−ai−bi ai−bi = 1 (∀i), then the total MSE can be represented by
Therefore, we can obtain the following optimization problem (omit the scaling constant n)
which has t bounded variables and t 2 linear constraints. The Hessian matrix of the objective function f (b) is positivedefinite in the feasible region. Thus, the optimization problem in (13) is also convex with linear constraints.
E. Comparison with LDP Mechanisms
We use a toy example to show the benefit of our mechanism (IDUE) comparing with mechanisms satisfying LDP. Assume a health organization is taking a survey which asks n users to return a response from categories {HIV, flu, headache, stomachache, toothache}, indexed by an integer i from {1,2,3,4,5}. Since the category HIV (i = 1) is more sensitive than the others, the privacy budget that represents the privacy level should be different. For example, we can set 1 = ln 4 for HIV and i = ln 6 (i = 1) for the others, where a smaller indicates a higher privacy level that needs stronger privacy protection. In order to protect privacy, the users randomly perturb their true answers with a certain probability. Specifically, the users first generate a vector x with five bits, where only the position of the truth is 1 and other positions are 0s, then flip each bit with assigned probabilities (depending on the mechanisms) to generate the output vector y. Finally, the organization aggregates all perturbed vectors y from n users and estimate the counts of these categories by the estimatorĉ i .
In Table II , we show that our proposed mechanism IDUE outperforms the state-of-the-art mechanisms (RAPPOR [4] and OUE [7] ) under the given privacy levels of inputs, where a smaller total variance i Var[ĉ i ] indicates a better utility. In our IDUE mechanism, the flipping probabilities for i = 1 and i = 1 are different due to the different privacy levels, while mechanisms satisfying LDP (e.g., RAPPOR and OUE) do not differentiate them. By adjusting the flipping probabilities for different bits, IDUE can achieve the optimal utility with the required protection. The total variance i Var[ĉ i ] of our mechanism IDUE is in a range because it depends on the distribution of true input data. We can see that the upper bound is still less than that of the existing mechanisms, indicating that our mechanisms outperform others even in the worst-case. For IDUE under notion MinID-LDP, the probability of flipping the bit for i = 1 is relatively large, which leads to a larger variance of this bit, but allows other bits have less flipping probabilities and smaller variance for i = 1.
VI. MECHANISM FOR ITEM-SET INPUT
In this section, we consider the item-set input, where the input domain is D = P(I), i.e., the power set of I. If we directly apply the IDUE mechanism developed in Section V for this case, each possible set will need to be assigned two perturbation probabilities (for bit-0 and bit-1), therefore the computational cost of solving the optimization problem would be very high because the size of the input domain is 2 m . In this section, we solve the scalability issue by extending the IDUE mechanism with Padding-and-Sampling (PS) protocol to adapt to item-set input. The privacy analysis shows that if mechanism IDUE satisfies MinID-LDP, then the extended one IDUE-PS satisfies this privacy as well.
A. The Padding-and-Sampling Protocol
Assume the raw data of each user is a set of items, where the number of items in each set can be different. This problem is more challenging than the single-item input even under LDP notion because the user has more than one item, where each item would split privacy budget (reporting all items will lead to large noise in each item and thus bad utility of query). However, if adopting sampling technique to avoid budget splitting, the different number of items in each user makes Algorithm 2 Padding-and-Sampling (PS) [7] Input: Item-set input x ∈ D and dummy set S with |S| = . Output: One item xs ∈ x ∪ S 1: Set the padded input xp ← x 2: if |x| < then 3: Select ( − |x|) dummy items with uniform random from S and add them into xp 4: else if |x| > then 5: Drop out (|x| − ) items with uniform random from xp 6: end if 7: Sample one item xs with uniform random from xp the frequency estimation much harder because the sampling probability depends on the number of items of the user which should be kept private. A good solution to address the item-set type of input is the Padding-and-Sampling protocol [7] .
The high-level idea of this Padding-and-Sampling protocol is first converting the original item-set into a new item-set with a fixed length by padding some dummy items (or truncating those with length longer than ), and then sampling only one item from the padded set for uploading. Algorithm 2 shows the steps of this Padding-and-Sampling protocol, where the given item-set input x ∈ D is padded (or truncated) into a new set x p with a fixed length and finally one item x s is randomly sampled from the padded set x p . The fixed length is a system parameter which will affect the utility in some way (depending on the data distribution). More details of selecting a good is discussed in [7] . In this paper, we assume is given in advance.
B. Mechanism Design and Privacy Analysis
IDUE with Padding-and-Sampling for Item-set Input. By adopting the Padding-and-Sampling (PS) protocol, our previous mechanism IDUE (Algorithm 1) can be extended for set-valued input. Algorithm 3 shows the steps (sampling, encoding, and perturbing) of our extended mechanism named IDUE-PS, where the data is perturbed according to the sampled item's parameters under the single item case. Since each item will be sampled with probability 1 from the padded set x p , the frequency estimation result needs to be multiplied by the factor , i.e.,ĉ i = · ci−nbi ai−bi . Fig. 2 shows the diagram of perturbation steps in the user-side and aggregation (on frequency estimation) in the server-side.
Since the original item-set input x is padded with some dummy items from a domain S that is disjoint from the original item domain I, the item domain is extended to be I ∪S. We denote the new item domain I = {1, 2, · · · , m+ }, where the last items are dummy items. Since the size of I is (m + ), the encoded vector x has (m + ) bits. Assume the perturbation probabilities of i-th bit are a i , b i , and denote
Since α i − β i = ai−bi bi(1−bi) and 0 < b i a i < 1, we have 1 β i α i , and α i = β i only when a i = b i . Before proving the privacy guarantee of IDUE-PS, we show the following useful lemma first.
Algorithm 3 IDUE-PS for Item-Set Input
Input: Item-set input x ∈ D and dummy set S with |S| = .
Perturbation probabilities (ai, bi) for i ∈ I . Output: Vector y ∈ {0, 1} m+ 1: Let x = [0, · · · , 0] with length (m + ) 2: Sample one item xs ∈ x ∪ S by PS protocol (Algorithm 2). 3 bi(1−aj ) is the upper bound of Pr(y|x=i) Pr(y|x =j) , the distinguishability of a pair of item-set inputs x and x in (15) can be regarded as the combined distinguishability of the items that belong to the two sets. The parameter η x can be explained as the probability of sampling i ∈ I from the padded set x p of input x. If both |x| and |x | are greater or equal to (then η x = η x = 1), the distinguishability of the pair is averaged only among the items in the set; if not (then η x < 1 or η x < 1), the distinguishability of the dummy items will be involved since the original set would be padded with dummy items. From Lemma 2, we observe that the distinguishability in IDUE-PS is determined by the privacy levels of the items in the pair of inputs (besides the number of items in the input set), which indicates that the IDUE-PS satisfies the notion of MinID-LDP in some way (discussed below).
Privacy Analysis. In (15) , the upper bound of the probability ratio Pr(y|x) Pr(y|x ) are related to the perturbation probabilities of dummy items, i.e., a i and b i for i = m + 1, · · · , m + .
Since the dummy items themselves are not sensitive, we can select some reasonable values as their privacy levels. In this paper, we assume the privacy levels and perturbation probabilities of different dummy items are the same, denoted as i = * , a i = a * , b i = b * (i = m + 1, · · · , m + ), then (15) can be rewritten as
where α * = a * b * and β * = 1−a * 1−b * . We consider the following expression of privacy budget for an item-set
which can be regarded as the combined privacy budget of the items in the set x (the privacy level of dummy items will be involved when |x| < , i.e., η x < 1). Generally speaking, the combined privacy budget defined in (17) is larger than the averaged privacy budget i∈x i /|x| because the exponential function f ( ) = e is convex with property
where 0 k i 1 and i k i = 1. Based on the results in Lemma 2, we show the fact that IDUE-PS satisfies MinID-LDP. Theorem 4 If mechanism IDUE with perturbation probabilities a i , b i (i ∈ I) satisfies MinID-LDP for single-item input with privacy budget 1 , 2 , · · · , m , i.e.,
then IDUE-PS with the same perturbation probabilities will satisfy MinID-LDP for item-set input, i.e.,
Pr(y|x) Pr(y|x )
e min{ x, x } (∀x, x ∈ D, ∀y)
where privacy budget of item-set is defined in (17) and the privacy budget of dummy items * ∈ { 1 , 2 , · · · , m },
According to Theorem 4, the perturbation probabilities in IDUE-PS for item-set input can be determined with the same way in IDUE, i.e., solving the optimization problems (10) with only 2t variables and t 2 constraints to get the optimal solution (t is the number of privacy levels), or the constrained models (12) and (13) with less computational cost to get the near-optimal solution. For the privacy budget of dummy items, theoretically, we can select * to be any value from { 1 , 2 , · · · , m }. Though a larger * will improve the utility of dummy items, the result of frequency estimation for dummy items will be ignored in aggregation because they are not our task. Also, the value of * (selected from the original budgets) does not change the optimization problem and the optimal solution because the objective function (only depends on original items) and constraints (only depends on privacy levels) are the same. Therefore, we select * = min{ 1 , 2 , · · · , m } to guarantee the privacy with smaller budget x in (17) .
VII. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of frequency estimation for our mechanism IDUE (IDUE-PS for item-set input) and compare them with RAPPOR [4] and OUE [6] . Note that RAPPOR and OUE satisfy -LDP with = min{E}, while IDUE and IDUE-PS satisfy E-MinID-LDP. The perturbation probabilities in IDUE (and IDUE-PS) can be obtained by three optimization models in (10), (12) , and (13), denoted by opt0, opt1 and opt2 respectively.
Datasets. We conduct the experiments over two synthetic single-item datasets and three real item-set datasets, obtained from public data sources.
(1) Power-law Distribution. The synthetic dataset with number of users n = 100, 000 and item domain size m = 100. The raw data of each user is obtained by generating a random value from the power-law distribution with the law's exponent α = 2, then scaling and rounding into an integer that belongs to I = {1, 2, · · · , m}.
(2) Uniform Distribution. The synthetic dataset with number of users n = 100, 000 and item domain size m = 1, 000. The raw data of each user is uniformly generated from I = {1, 2, · · · , m}.
(3) Kosarak [24] . An anonymous click-stream data of a Hungarian on-line news portal. There are around 1 million users with 8 million click events for 41,270 different pages.
(4) Retail [24] . A retail market basket dataset supplied by an anonymous Belgian retail supermarket store. There are 88,162 customers who have bought 16,470 different items.
(5) MSNBC [25] . The real-world data that records the sequence of viewed pages at the level of page category (not the level of URL) of users during a twenty-four hour period. There are around 1 million users with 14 categories, the average number of visits is 5.7 per user. Different from the previous datasets, the same category might appear multiple times in each user's record, which leads to the extremely uneven sequence length for different users.
The Setting of Privacy Budget. We consider the multiple privacy levels of the inputs, thus we need to assign multiple privacy budgets to them. Assume there are four privacy levels with privacy budget { , 1.2 , 2 , 4 } (as default values), where is the system parameter of privacy budget. The privacy budget for all items are randomly selected from the four values with a certain budget distribution, where the default distribution is {5%, 5%, 5%, 85%}, and we will change the budget distribution and the number of levels in the experiments to evaluate their impact.
A. Synthetic Data
Validation of the Theoretical Analysis. Fig. 3 shows the empirical and theoretical results of the MSE of the estimated frequency under Power-law and Uniform distributions. The empirical results (solid lines) are very close to the theoretical results (dashed lines), which validates the correctness of our theoretical analysis. We can observe that mechanisms satisfying LDP and MinID-LDP have relatively similar utility but IDUE with MinID-LDP outperforms RAPPOR and OUE by Fig. 4 : Under different budget distributions adjusting the perturbation probabilities for different inputs. For IDUE under MinID-LDP, the reduced optimization models (i.e., opt1 and opt2) have relatively larger MSEs than the original optimization model (i.e., opt0) due to the further constrained variable space, but they still can provide the nearoptimal solution for IDUE with less computational complexity.
B. Real-World Data
Influence of Different Budget Distributions. Fig. 4 shows the results of Kosarak dataset (single-item) and Retail dataset (item-set) with different privacy budget distributions, where the first item of each user in Kosarak dataset are extracted to obtain the single-item version. Since RAPPOR and OUE use the minimum value of all privacy budgets as the uniform budget, which is independent of the budget distribution, we only show one line for RAPPOR and OUE respectively. From Fig. 4 (a), we can observe that our mechanism IDUE outperforms the other two mechanisms and its MSE would gradually get close to the MSE of OUE when the budget distribution becomes more uniform (i.e., {25%, 25%, 25%, 25%}). But when the proportion of insensitive items with larger privacy budget is increased, the advantage of discriminating inputs with different budgets becomes much more obvious. Fig. 4 (b) compares the performance of the default (approximately exponential) privacy budget distributions with 4 different levels (t = 4) and exponential budget distribution with 20 levels (t = 20) where the values are uniformly selected from the range [1 , 4 ] and their distribution is exponentially proportional to the budget (i.e., ∝ e i ). The results show that our mechanism outperforms the existing ones for item-set data as well.
Influence of the Padding Length for Item-Set Data. For our mechanism IDUE-PS satisfying MinID-LDP with privacy budget of item-set defined in (17) , we use opt0 to solve the optimization problem. Fig. 5 shows the results of Retail and MSNBC dataset with different padding length . We can observe that the IDUE-PS outperforms the other two both in the total MSE of all items and the MSE of top 5 frequent items under different . This is partly because our MinID-LDP notion is more fine-grained than LDP, and the privacy level of our IDUE-PS mechanism is relaxed compared with LDP since x that is defined in (17) for each set x is larger or equal to min{ i } i∈x . Another notable observation is that the padding length would have a great influence on the mechanism performance. If is too small, the frequency estimator will underestimate the frequency and becomes biased because the actual sampling rate is less than 1/ ; if is too large, the variance will be enlarged since the frequency estimation result is multiplied by [7] . Both of the two cases will lead to bad utility and how to determine a good for set-valued data will be our future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a new privacy notion named ID-LDP with an instantiation MinID-LDP is proposed to provide inputdiscriminative protection in the local setting. MinID-LDP is shown to satisfy the sequential composition theorem as LDP and can be regarded as the fine-grained version of LDP. We propose the perturbation mechanism framework IDUE that satisfies ID-LDP, where the perturbation probabilities are solved by the optimization problem with reasonable scale. Then, based on Padding-and-Sampling protocol, the mechanism is extended to apply to item-set input, named IDUE-PS, to solve the scalability and utility problem for the item-set type of input. IDUE-PS is also shown to satisfy MinID-LDP. Finally, experimental results validate the advantage of our privacy notion and mechanisms, compared with the existing ones.
For future work, we will extend our work to handle more complex data types (e.g., high-dimensional data) and complex analysis tasks such as heavy hitter estimation. APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2 Proof: Denote vector v i = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0] with length (m + ), where only the i-th position is 1 (i ∈ I ). From the Padding-and-Sampling protocol in Algorithm 2,
Pr(y|x) = xs∈x∪S
Pr(x s is sampled) · Pr(y|x s )
where η x is defined in Lemma 2. On the other hand, = e x where x is defined in (17) . On the other hand, according to α i /β j e min{ i, j } , we have β * /α max e − * and β j /α max e − j (∀j ∈ I). Then (16) 
